Conflicts in the Middle East and Africa heighten the terrorist threat

The Gaza conflict has increased the conflict level in the Middle East and slowed down established normalisation and de-escalation processes in the region. The level of conflict will remain high in 2025.
 

Sharp conflict escalation and destabilisation

The Gaza conflict has increased the level of conflict between Israel on one side and the Iran-led axis of resistance, including Hezbollah, Shia militias in Iraq and the Houthi movement in Yemen, on the other. The conflict between Israel and the axis of resistance rapidly changed pace and scope in 2024; Israel’s air and ground operations in Lebanon during the summer and autumn could have long-lasting negative consequences for the country.

In 2024, the Iran- and Russia-backed Houthi movement carried out several attacks against Western ships and targets in Israel. The attacks demonstrate that the Houthis have access to various types of weapons capable of targeting international shipping and regional adversaries. In addition, Iran-affiliated militias in Iraq have attacked targets in Israel and Western targets in Syria and Iraq.

The Gaza conflict has also slowed down established normalisation and de-escalation processes in the region, including those between Saudi Arabia and Iran and Saudi Arabia and Israel. Saudi Arabia’s intention to normalise these relations remains in place, and ceasefires between Israel and Hamas or Hezbollah could restore the normalisation processes.

Syria’s future is uncertain after Syrian rebel groups toppled President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Damascus. Israel has responded by reinforcing its presence in and control over the occupied border area in the Golan Heights, as well as by launching missile strikes against weapons stores in Syria to prevent the weapons from falling into the hands of the new rulers.

Russia has significantly increased its influence in Africa over a period of several years. This development is strategically motivated and undermines Western interests. Russia will seek to further strengthen its influence in Africa in 2025.

Russia established several new political, military, economic and cultural partnerships with African countries in 2024. This bolsters Russia’s influence on the continent and secures access to raw materials and minerals in exchange for Russian security support, primarily to the countries’ authoritarian regimes. Russia has maintained a military presence in Libya, the Central African Republic and Mali for an extended period of time; in 2024, it also dispatched forces to Niger, Burkina Faso and Equatorial Guinea. This demonstrates Russia’s ability to expand its involvement in Africa, even militarily, despite the substantial burden of the war in Ukraine.
 

Undermining Western interests

Russia’s involvement in Africa secures access to resources and counters political isolation and Western sanctions. Russia is also taking advantage of these partnerships to undermine the West.

For several years, Russian information operations have fuelled anti-Western sentiment and tarnished the West’s reputation in Africa, and on several occasions, new partnerships with Russia have led African countries to terminate political and military cooperation with Western nations. In Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso, Russia supported leaders of successful military coups and was a driving force behind the countries’ development of an anti-Western and pro-Russian alliance in the Sahel region.

Russia’s efforts in Africa subvert democracy and human rights on the continent. These partnerships provide authoritarian regimes with military assets that help suppress both political and armed opposition. Authoritarian African regimes’ brutal and arbitrary use of power against their own populations also provides favourable conditions for the growth of terrorist groups on the continent.

Conflict and political instability in various parts of the world have offered terrorist groups fertile ground for growth and greater scope for action. Terrorist organisations in particular are exploiting the Gaza conflict in order to recruit and mobilise for terrorist attacks. Great power rivalry and a weakened international cooperation climate make the terrorist threat more challenging to tackle.
 

Terrorist organisations are gaining strength

Developments in the Middle East and Africa provide significant scope for action. The Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda are adapting to political turmoil and counterterrorism campaigns, and they remain the greatest global terrorist threat. These groups have a significant growth potential in areas marked by conflict, poor living conditions and weak government control. IS and al-Qaeda are marshalling support and will continue to attract sympathisers in 2025.

The Gaza conflict has a considerable polarising effect and fuels anti-Western sentiment in many parts of the world. IS and al-Qaeda exploit this for radicalisation and recruitment purposes and devote extensive attention to Gaza in their propaganda.

The fall of the Assad regime increases IS’s scope for action in Syria. The regime’s Russia- and Iran-backed operations in the central desert regions have ceased, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are under pressure in north-eastern Syria and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) is under national strain as a result of the group’s takeover in Damascus. In addition, Israeli air operations have significantly weakened Syria’s military capabilities. This limits the Syrian actors’ ability to exert pressure on IS, giving IS new and substantial scope for action in the country.

As Russian influence increases and Western influence wanes, both IS and al-Qaeda continue to strengthen their positions in Africa. The two groups have been particularly successful in Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. The progress in Africa enables IS and al-Qaeda to retain their global foothold. The two groups pose a significant threat in their own core areas, including against local Western interests, as the terrorist threat to targets in the West also grows.