F25K1_Kapittelside

Russia

Russia considers itself to be in direct conflict with the West. This view will persist regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, and tensions between Russia and the West will remain high in 2025.

Russia has the upper hand in the war, but has not managed to force a major breakthrough. Ending the war in Ukraine on Russian terms is Moscow’s top priority in the year ahead. Western weapons support to Ukraine is obstructing Russia from achieving its aims. Russia is seeking to exert pressure on the West, including through sabotage operations. This could impact Norway.

Persistent tensions between Russia and the West
 

Western arms support is crucial to Ukraine’s ability to defend itself against Russian aggression, and is the single most important factor that will influence the war’s progress in 2025. Russia seeks to deter Western support using physical and digital sabotage and the threat of nuclear weapons. Although these courses of action demonstrate willingness to challenge the West, Moscow would like to avoid a direct military confrontation with NATO.

If Western arms support were to increase and Ukraine succeed in the difficult task of maintaining access to enough fighting personnel, the war could tip in Ukraine’s favour as we head into 2026. If so, Russia would respond by taking greater risks and employing a wider range of means against Ukraine’s Western supporters, in order to prevent and undermine popular support for Western arms contributions. In addition to threats aimed at Western audiences, Russia may resort to acts of sabotage against both weapons deliveries and critical infrastructure. This could also affect Norway.

An end to the war on Russian terms would strengthen Moscow’s belief in military force as a foreign policy instrument and may embolden it to reconstitute and apply military force elsewhere as well. States that are located close to Russian borders and that are not NATO members are most vulnerable to Moscow’s military coercion.

The war in Ukraine is taking its toll on Russia 
 

War has been raging in Ukraine for almost three years now. The economic, military and security policy costs have been much higher than Moscow anticipated.
 

Weakened economy

Russia claims that its economy is strong and that it is coping well with the war and its ripple effects. The reality is very different. Russia’s economy is under heavy strain and has become increasingly vulnerable. The war has weakened it significantly, and Moscow is funding its war effort by draining sectors and budget items that underpin the population’s living standards and welfare. Russia tries to hide this from both the Russian people and the outside world by denying public access to macroeconomic figures. Adjusted for inflation, Russia’s GDP development is negative and its economy is in recession. The country’s current budgetary policy is unsustainable, and the risk of economic destabilisation is mounting.

Military spending has risen sharply during the full-scale war in Ukraine. Russia’s official federal budget for 2025 plans for an increase in military spending of 25 per cent. In total, the budget plans for allocations to the armed forces and national security to amount to approximately 41 per cent.

Sky-high military spending and Western sanctions have put significant macroeconomic strain on Russia. The economy is marked by high demand, high inflation, high debt, a significant labour shortage, a falling trade surplus and a weaker currency. By attempting to produce more than available resources allow, Russia is creating imbalance and bottlenecks in the economy. This exacerbates existing weaknesses such as inefficient production, corruption and low innovation, and makes the economy susceptible to economic shocks.

The Russian authorities are manipulating economic data in order to give the impression that Russia is absorbing the costs of the war well, that sanctions are ineffective and that the economy is growing. This is intended to ensure domestic stability and support for the war, undermine the Western sanctions regime and encourage investment from Russia’s partners, particularly China and India.

Weakened security policy position

Russia’s security policy position has become significantly weaker. Sweden and Finland have joined NATO and made the alliance stronger. Economic cooperation with China is crucial to Russia’s ability to fund the war in Ukraine; the war has therefore made Moscow more dependent on Beijing. Russia has also lost influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. The fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was a strategic setback for the Kremlin; Russia has lost its most important supporter in the region and seen its influence in the Middle East decline.

With new rulers in Damascus, Moscow risks losing access to the military bases Hmeimim and Tartus, which are important to Russia’s ability to employ its armed forces in the Mediterranean and support the Russian presence in Africa. These developments undermine Russia’s main foreign policy objective, namely to consolidate its position as a great power.

Weakened military power

Moscow is attempting to project an image of strength through ambitious plans for expanding its armed forces. However, Russia is not in a position to rebuild and expand its forces at home whilst simultaneously maintaining its war effort in Ukraine. The war is the top priority.

Russia has grand plans for expanding its land power, including its presence along the entire border with NATO. Near Norwegian borders, Russia wants to expand several brigades into divisions and establish a new army corps which will eventually be located in Karelia. Russia has also created the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, with the aim of increasing Russian defensive capability. Leningrad Military District is charged with defence and military operations in the Baltic Sea region and the Nordics, and possibly also in the Arctic in collaboration with the Northern Fleet. The formation of the two new military districts reverses the most recent major defence reform of 2008. The new military districts are based on the former Western Military District’s force structure, with added units along the border with NATO.

Russia will have little chance of realising these plans while the war continues at the current intensity. At the earliest, Moscow may be able to fully realise these plans five to ten years after the war in Ukraine is over.

The war occupies much of Russian land power. This includes the forces on the Kola Peninsula, many of whom have been deployed to Ukraine. The war has also led to a sharp decline in Russia’s ability to reinforce land, airborne and combat air forces in the High North.

Russia has suffered high losses in Ukraine. At least 115,000 Russian soldiers have been killed, and when those wounded, imprisoned or missing are taken into account, Russia has lost more than 600,000 soldiers in this war, as well as over 11,000 armoured fighting vehicles.

In order to uphold combat power in Ukraine, Russia has likely multiplied its production of new land power materiel since 2022. The country has also brought large amounts of ageing military materiel out of strategic storage, and restored and modernised it. This is cheaper and likely also quicker than producing new materiel, which is advantageous to a country that is in major economic difficulties and suffering high materiel losses in Ukraine. Overall, Russia’s combat-ready store of military materiel remained almost unchanged throughout 2024, and the Russian land forces are larger at the start of 2025 than they were prior to the full-scale assault in 2022.

However, materiel brought out of strategic storage is often of lower quality than the materiel it replaces, and several materiel categories will likely have next to no reserves for the next two years. This will reduce the land forces’ combat endurance for a very long time to come.

The Russian naval forces are facing a widening gap between ambitions and resources. This is forcing the Northern Fleet to choose between solving missions and performing necessary maintenance. Difficulties at the shipyards cause maintenance backlogs that impair many ageing vessels’ capability. High allied activity in the High North inflicts further attrition and strain on the Russian forces. This affects force generation and puts combat power in the Russian navy under pressure; the only exception is submarines, which are a top priority.

Russia circumvents Western sanctions

The Russian defence industry is struggling with Western sanctions and tightened export restrictions. Russia relies on Western technology to develop and manufacture military materiel. As military requirements increase, Russia will make growing use of civilian technology in its weapons programmes. Norwegian-manufactured maritime technology and communication and navigation technology is highly attractive to Russia. Civilian navigation equipment can be used in artillery systems, weapon stations and UAV navigational antennas.

Russian actors use a range of methods to circumvent Western sanctions and export restrictions. One involves setting up complex procurement networks using legitimate European companies as contacts for European technology providers. The actors use the EU free market to obtain Western technology, concealing parts of the supply chain and the Russian end user. To support technology procurement, Russian actors have set up a plethora of new companies in Central and South-East Asia. Russia also gains access to Western technology through China, which re-exports Western-manufactured technology and exports Chinese-manufactured technology with Western components.

Russian procurement networks mostly operate covertly, employing a wide range of methods and a high degree of adaptability. Despite this, Western sanctions are restricting Russia’s access to Western technology and causing delays in a number of advanced Russian weapons programmes.

A shadow fleet, freighting oil, petroleum products and liquefied natural gas, offers Russia energy revenue that is essential to the country’s war economy. The shadow fleet transports a growing proportion of Russia’s ocean-going oil exports.

The shadow fleet undermines sanctions and safe shipping, and presents a challenge to Norway. In addition to circumventing sanctions, the shadow fleet distorts competition and carries a risk of accidents and incidents occurring near Norwegian borders that could prove difficult to handle. Shadow fleet vessels are characterised by being old, technically unsound and not insured according to industry standards. Ship ownership and liability is often unclear, and the ships are often in breach of international maritime standards for verification of operational status, working conditions and safe navigation.

Russian export infrastructure and refinery capacity is concentrated in the western part of the country, and in 2024 Russia shipped more than half of its ocean-going oil exports out of ports on the Baltic Sea. Consequently, many shadow fleet vessels sail close to Norwegian waters.

•  Military use of civilian technology challenges export controls

The use of civilian technology in military weapons programmes challenges traditional export controls. Civilian technology can be used in weapons and military surveillance, detection, monitoring, planning, construction and maintenance systems.

Russia, China, Iran and North Korea are among the countries that use a variety of methods to obtain and exploit civilian Western technology for military purposes. Complex procurement networks conceal the end user from both the supplier and national export control mechanisms.

These actors also gain access to Western technology with military applications by participating in internationalscience and technology research collaborations.

Norwegian-manufactured maritime technology and communication and navigation technology, as well as Norwegian research and development in the fields of semiconductor and sensor technology, material technology, cryptology, IT security, biotechnology and artificial intelligence, are all attractive targets of covert procurement by actors who are subject to sanctions and export controls.

The war in Ukraine will remain Russia’s top priority
 

Although the warfighting is weakening Russia’s economy, military and security policy position, the war in Ukraine remains President Putin’s top priority. To Moscow, the war is not just about Ukraine’s future, but also an attempt to influence Europe in line with Russian security interests. Russia considers itself more willing and able to endure war and confrontation than Ukraine or the West.
 

Russia’s war objectives remain unchanged 

Russia’s overall objectives in Ukraine remain unchanged. The country’s territorial ambitions include, at a minimum, the four annexed oblasts of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzha and Kherson, and likely also include Kharkiv oblast and the Ukrainian Black Sea coast in the longer term. Russia will prioritise reclaiming lost territory and securing the northern border to Ukraine.

Moscow’s political ambition is for Ukraine to remain outside NATO, to lack any credible Western security guarantees and to be subject to Russia’s sphere of influence. In order to achieve this, Russia is trying to exhaust Ukraine militarily and inflict such high costs on the civilian population that the Ukrainian government will be forced to negotiate peace on Russian terms. Russia is also seeking to weaken the West’s military, diplomatic and economic support to Ukraine.

Russian upper hand, yet no breakthrough

In 2024, the war developed to some extent in Russia’s favour, increasing its territorial control of Ukrainian territory by approximately 3,400 square kilometres; this is an area slightly smaller than the Norwegian county of Østfold. Russia did not succeed in translating this initiative into a larger breakthrough, and lost tens of thousands of soldiers each month, at times up to 30,000, in order to achieve this marginal territorial advance.

In August, Ukraine tried to reclaim the initiative by conducting a military operation in the Russian oblast of Kursk. The operation showed that Ukraine is capable of conducting offensive military operations; it also surprised Russia and reflected badly on the Kremlin. Despite this, Russia prioritised upholding its effort in Donetsk over regrouping forces to retake control of Kursk.

The war continues

Russia has approximately 1,150,000 active soldiers and up to 22 million people of fighting age. This means the country is well placed to recruit and mobilise military personnel, and that it is likely to maintain its access to combatants throughout 2025. It may be that the economic incentives to enlist are sufficient, and there is no sign that Russia is planning another mobilisation.

The warfighting in Ukraine currently favours quantity over quality. Russia’s access to North Korean soldiers therefore eases personnel demand somewhat in certain front sectors, but is negligible compared to the total number of Russian combatants and losses along the front. Efficient integration with Russian forces is hampered by a lack of joint training and language barriers. For now, the North Korean soldiers’ warfighting on European soil is primarily of political significance, and would have to increase sharply in order to reduce the need for Russian personnel to any significant extent.

Although Russia has economic scope to sustain the war in 2025, starting from 2026 there is a growing risk that the war effort will be impeded by a lack of funds. The Russian authorities can boost their ability to finance the war by raising taxes on the population, the elite and major exporters, and by cutting in other budget items; however, this carries a high risk of domestic instability.

Russia has an extensive trade and defence industry cooperation with third countries, which supports the war effort in Ukraine and the long-term development of the Russian armed forces. North Korea and Iran supply military materiel, including drones and artillery shells, directly to Russia. China is Russia’s most important trading partner and supports the war economy by importing Russian oil and exporting Chinese components, materials and production equipment to the Russian military industry. As a result, Russia has the funds and military materiel required to sustain the warfighting intensity throughout 2025, and will highly likely retain the initiative and secure gradual territorial advances.

These essential requirements will gradually diminish, however – particularly in 2026. This could prompt Russia to alter its approach to the war, provided that Ukraine is able to continue recruiting and training personnel and receives sufficient amounts of Western military materiel. In order to reclaim the initiative, Ukraine would have to increase personnel recruitment and training sharply and improve access to military materiel.

Growing number of attacks on rear areas

The importance of attacks deep inside enemy territory will increase in 2025. Since the invasion began, Russia has attacked critical infrastructure in Ukraine using both missiles and drones, and in 2024 it directed massive missile strikes against Ukraine’s energy sector. The purpose is to exacerbate war-weariness and weaken industrial output and other critical functions, as well as to cause an exodus of refugees intended to undermine Western support for Ukraine’s defensive struggle.

Russia has increased domestic UAV production and established production of Iranian UAVs. Improved access to UAVs will increase the scope of attacks deep inside Ukraine in 2025.

Ukraine also directed long-range drone strikes against oil and energy installations and military targets on Russian soil in 2024. This included attacks on Russian strategic bombers stationed at Olenegorsk airbase on the Kola Peninsula. These attacks have weakened Russian revenue, inflicted reconstruction costs and forced the Russian military to disperse and operate across greater distances, which in turn complicates logistics. The attacks also make the realities of war clearer to the Russian people, thereby challenging Russian propaganda about the course of the war. Ukraine will continue these attacks in 2025, including against Russian military-strategic targets close to Norwegian borders.

Much uncertainty regarding negotiations

There is a possibility of attempted peace talks in 2025. The new US administration’s approach to arms support and negotiations is a great source of uncertainty in both Moscow and Kyiv.

At the start of 2025, Russia has a stronger negotiating position than Ukraine. However, the strength of Russia’s negotiating position could weaken towards the end of the year and into 2026, provided that Ukraine retains access to military personnel and equipment.

In any potential negotiations, Russian demands would be maximalist in nature. In addition to demands concerning Ukrainian territory and security policy neutrality, Russia would demand restrictions on Ukraine’s military power and easing of Western sanctions. If China were to reduce its support to Russia and the West increase its support to Ukraine sufficiently to tip the war in Ukraine’s favour, Russia’s willingness to negotiate would increase and its negotiating position weaken.

Reduced Western support, increased Western pressure to negotiate, growing war-weariness due to high casualty rates, symbolic defeats or winter power outages are all factors that could make Ukraine more willing to negotiate and weaken its negotiating position. A significant weakening of the country’s military power could force a negotiated solution whereby Ukraine accepts Russian demands.

Regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, Russia will continue to perceive the West as a threat. Therefore, Moscow would consider a negotiated solution a pause in, rather than an end to, its confrontation with Ukraine and the West. Russia would take advantage of this pause to rebuild its economy, industry and armed forces. As with a Russian military victory, a negotiated solution on Russian terms would mean that Russia would pose a persistent threat to Europe.

Increased Russian focus on the Nordics, the West and NATO
 

Sweden and Finland’s memberships have strengthened NATO. Russia believes that the NATO enlargement has heightened the threat to its western border and challenged its scope for action in the Baltic Sea. At the same time, Moscow is uncertain how the enlargement will affect NATO’s military-strategic posture in the north. It is therefore turning more of its attention, both politically and militarily, to the Baltic Sea and the Nordics.
 

Russia responds to the NATO enlargement

Russia will continue its threatening rhetoric and attempts at influencing Sweden, Finland and NATO in general. The aforementioned establishment of the Leningrad and Moscow military districts indicates a stronger military focus in a westerly and north-westerly direction. The war in Ukraine limits Russia’s ability to augment the land forces’ military presence and capability in real terms along the north-western border with NATO, and a major strategic land power exercise in 2025 therefore seems unlikely.

Instead, Russia will prioritise surveillance and intelligence collection against the Nordic countries, in order to detect changes to NATO strategies, plans and basing policy. The Northern Fleet will maintain a presence in order to stay on top of developments and display defensive capability in the north, including near Norwegian borders. Russia may also bolster its naval presence and activity directed at NATO in the Baltic Sea, should it perceive its ability to defend and resupply Kaliningrad to be under pressure.

The Northern Fleet poses a considerable threat 

The Northern Fleet secures Russia’s important northern flank. Its primary mission is to provide strategic deterrence, defend the northern bastion and threaten NATO’s strategic locations, naval forces and key maritime supply lines. The fleet adapts its activities and activity levels to convey dissatisfaction and adjust tension levels with NATO. Russia has transferred operational command of the Russian fleets from the military districts to the commander of the Russian Navy. This offers greater flexibility in the use of naval forces across the fleets.

New multirole submarines and modern frigates are important to solving the Northern Fleet’s missions. No major changes to Russian naval power are expected, but the Northern Fleet is gradually taking receipt of new vessels. In 2025, the fleet will have three modern SEVERODVINSK-class multirole submarines and three modern frigates armed with hypersonic Tsirkon missiles. The missiles’ extremely high velocity makes them very difficult for air defence systems to handle.

The Northern Fleet’s strategic multirole submarines, armed with cruise missiles, maintain a presence and provide deterrence close to Norwegian borders. In 2025, the Northern Fleet will prioritise regular deployments to the Atlantic Ocean, and possibly a large-scale strategic naval exercise.

Strategic bombers to remain on the Kola Peninsula

Russia has stationed strategic bombers at airbases on the Kola Peninsula in order to reduce their vulnerability to Ukrainian attacks. The aircraft will remain here throughout 2025. They will primarily conduct cruise missile strikes on Ukraine, but also fly sorties westwards towards Europe and northwards towards the United States, in order to deter NATO. Russian strategic bombers will conduct regular strategic patrols near Norwegian borders.

Crucial weapons testing continues in the High North

Russia has announced a new armament programme that will be launched in 2025. It is likely to emphasise reconstitution of the land forces, with the addition of heavy materiel such as main battle tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery, as well as autonomous systems and strategic deterrent capabilities.

The submarine programme, long-range missiles and attack drones are all given high priority. Russia will continue research and development of anti-satellite weapons, strategic intercontinental weapons, strategic air defence, missile defence and long-range precision-guided weapons, and will be testing several of these weapons systems in the High North in 2025.

Russia’s Arctic policy to remain unchanged

Moscow is nowhere near achieving its lofty ambitions for developing Arctic Russia. In 2024, Russia transported just under 40 million tonnes of goods along the Northern Sea Route, approximately half of the annual target of 80 million tonnes.

Despite strong mistrust in the other Arctic states, Russia has remained on the Arctic Council. Moscow wants to counter political isolation and dependency on China, preferably by drawing other BRICS members into developing Russian energy and infrastructure projects in the Arctic. Access to non-Arctic states’ technology, capital and markets is crucial for Russia to succeed in these endeavours.

No improvement in relations with Norway

Russia considers Norway one of several ‘unfriendly countries’. This has caused Moscow to discontinue its policy of cooperation, which previously balanced Russian criticism of Norway as a NATO ally. The Russian state apparatus is allocating fewer resources and personnel to addressing its relationship with Norway and Norway-related matters. Rather, Russia is strengthening its cooperation with non-Western countries. Many new cooperation initiatives look eastwards, and both China and India have been singled out as key strategic partners.

It has always been important to Russia to prevent NATO from using Svalbard militarily. The current tensions between NATO and Russia have brought Svalbard’s military-strategic value to the fore in Moscow. Russia’s ambition to maintain a presence on Svalbard remains unchanged. Russia is seeking new collaboration partners for its activity in Barentsburg and the Pyramid, and has invited China and other BRICS countries to collaborate on research projects. China and Russia are likely to engage in research collaboration on Svalbard in 2025.

More extensive use of means

The expulsion of Russian intelligence personnel from European countries has compelled Russia to make more frequent use of proxies in covert operations in Europe. These proxies conduct influence operations, political subversion, sabotage and information gathering on behalf of Russian state actors.

In 2024, the Russian intelligence and security services (RISS) recruited Europeans via digital platforms, offering them payment for performing specific and gradually more serious acts of sabotage. It would seem that a spate of arson attacks and vandalism across Europe over the past year have been part of a large-scale, coordinated Russian effort to deter and sabotage Western arms support to Ukraine. The use of proxies weakens RISS’s control of the execution phase, and demonstrates that Russia has lowered the threshold for sabotage operations against Western targets and accepts a greater amount of risk associated with this type of operation. Russian risk appetite may increase further should the war develop in Ukraine’s favour.

RISS uses artificial intelligence and the internet to disseminate anti-Western narratives and encourage extremists, for instance in connection with controversial media stories. The purpose is to subvert and spark unrest in Western countries.

In December, the justice system in Romania annulled the country’s presidential election due to extensive Russian influence on TikTok and economic support to one of the candidates’ election campaigns. In 2024, the United States, France, Moldova and Georgia also reported Russian election influence. Reported activity includes widespread dissemination of anti-Western and pro-Kremlin content on TikTok, X, encrypted messaging apps and other web-based platforms. The purpose of these activities is to influence the elections to further Russian interests.

Pro-Russian hacktivist groups associated with RISS regularly conduct distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against Norwegian businesses. These attacks paralyse web-based services temporarily by overwhelming them with vast amounts of data traffic, and could sow doubts about Norwegian public institutions’ ability to provide services. Threat actors that support or are supported by Russia will probably continue to conduct DDoS attacks against Norway in 2025.

Russia uses non-military vessels as intelligence platforms near its own borders. Enhanced Norwegian efforts to exercise authority combined with port bans have limited this capability in Norwegian waters. In 2025, Russia will adapt to these limitations by using different types of vessels with legitimate access to Norwegian waters and ports.

In 2025, Russian threat actors will conduct computer network operations against Norwegian decision-making bodies, foreign service missions, the Norwegian Armed Forces, critical infrastructure, academia and technology companies, for the purpose of collecting intelligence. Collection efforts directed at critical infrastructure could also be intended to prepare for future digital sabotage.


 

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