Weakened military power
Moscow is attempting to project an image of strength through ambitious plans for expanding its armed forces. However, Russia is not in a position to rebuild and expand its forces at home whilst simultaneously maintaining its war effort in Ukraine. The war is the top priority.
Russia has grand plans for expanding its land power, including its presence along the entire border with NATO. Near Norwegian borders, Russia wants to expand several brigades into divisions and establish a new army corps which will eventually be located in Karelia. Russia has also created the Moscow and Leningrad military districts, with the aim of increasing Russian defensive capability. Leningrad Military District is charged with defence and military operations in the Baltic Sea region and the Nordics, and possibly also in the Arctic in collaboration with the Northern Fleet. The formation of the two new military districts reverses the most recent major defence reform of 2008. The new military districts are based on the former Western Military District’s force structure, with added units along the border with NATO.
Russia will have little chance of realising these plans while the war continues at the current intensity. At the earliest, Moscow may be able to fully realise these plans five to ten years after the war in Ukraine is over.
The war occupies much of Russian land power. This includes the forces on the Kola Peninsula, many of whom have been deployed to Ukraine. The war has also led to a sharp decline in Russia’s ability to reinforce land, airborne and combat air forces in the High North.
Russia has suffered high losses in Ukraine. At least 115,000 Russian soldiers have been killed, and when those wounded, imprisoned or missing are taken into account, Russia has lost more than 600,000 soldiers in this war, as well as over 11,000 armoured fighting vehicles.
In order to uphold combat power in Ukraine, Russia has likely multiplied its production of new land power materiel since 2022. The country has also brought large amounts of ageing military materiel out of strategic storage, and restored and modernised it. This is cheaper and likely also quicker than producing new materiel, which is advantageous to a country that is in major economic difficulties and suffering high materiel losses in Ukraine. Overall, Russia’s combat-ready store of military materiel remained almost unchanged throughout 2024, and the Russian land forces are larger at the start of 2025 than they were prior to the full-scale assault in 2022.
However, materiel brought out of strategic storage is often of lower quality than the materiel it replaces, and several materiel categories will likely have next to no reserves for the next two years. This will reduce the land forces’ combat endurance for a very long time to come.
The Russian naval forces are facing a widening gap between ambitions and resources. This is forcing the Northern Fleet to choose between solving missions and performing necessary maintenance. Difficulties at the shipyards cause maintenance backlogs that impair many ageing vessels’ capability. High allied activity in the High North inflicts further attrition and strain on the Russian forces. This affects force generation and puts combat power in the Russian navy under pressure; the only exception is submarines, which are a top priority.