3. Russia increasingly depends on China

Chapter

Russia

increasingly

depends

China

Focus

2025

Geopolitical interests pull China and Russia closer together, and the two countries have strengthened their strategic partnership over the past year. This is reflected in established cooperation platforms across many sectors and persistently high bilateral meeting activity at both political and official level. Russia has become more dependent on China, including for its ability to wage war in Ukraine. Trade is the main area of cooperation, with trade volume increasing, but Russia and China have also expanded their cooperation militarily and in the Arctic.

Nevertheless, caution and friction put some restraints on the relationship. China holds back to avoid incurring Western sanctions and to leverage Russia’s dependence in their negotiations, while Russia shields its strategic core interests.

Geopolitical interests drive the relationship

Geopolitical interests and development trends are bringing China and Russia closer together. A key driver is their shared ambition to challenge the power and influence of the United States and the West. China and Russia coordinate and collaborate to strengthen multilateral forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as a counterbalance to the EU and NATO, to erode the international standing of the United States, and to deepen the integration of their economies. The war in Ukraine has bolstered the relationship and made Russia even more dependent on China.

Caution and points of friction

Despite their strengthened partnership, both China and Russia remain cautious, which creates friction and prevents the relationship from deepening.

China wants to avoid secondary sanctions

Beijing is moderating its support to Moscow in order to avoid Western secondary sanctions. This limits the cooperation of larger Chinese companies and institutions with Russian counterparts, while smaller actors without direct ties to the Chinese state have more leeway. China’s caution is also part of its negotiating strategy.

Sector-specific self-interest in the Arctic

In 2024, Russia and China expanded their cooperation in the Arctic, but the initiatives seem poorly coordinated. Arctic cooperation will continue to increase, but friction and self-interest will continue to mark the relationship. China has a long-term perspective on its Arctic presence and will put national interests first, which means capitalising on Russia’s dependence in order to negotiate favourable bilateral agreements.

Russia and China strengthened their cooperation on the Northern Sea Route in 2024. In May, President Xi and President Putin announced that China and Russia will establish a commission for cooperation on this maritime route. China will exploit the cooperation to increase Russia’s dependence on Chinese expertise and investments, thereby further shifting the power balance in its favour.

Following up on their first joint coastguard exercise, China and Russia conducted a joint coastguard patrol in the Bering Strait in 2024. According to Russian media, the two countries will carry out joint coastguard exercises on an annual basis from now on.

Russian opposition to Chinese military capabilities in the Barents Sea and the western Arctic will persist, but in 2024, China and Russia conducted their first joint strategic bomber sortie north of the Bering Strait, in the eastern Arctic. The sortie is one of several indications that the parties are ramping up their bilateral military cooperation.

Strengthened military cooperation

China and Russia will further strengthen their military cooperation in 2025, with joint exercises and defence industry exchanges as the most prominent forms of collaboration.

Exercises and joint training but mistrust remain

In recent years, Russia and China have carried out progressively more comprehensive exercises involving their naval and air forces. The main objective of the joint exercises is to demonstrate strategic cohesion and strength vis-à-vis the US and the West. The exercises build trust, yet enduring mutual distrust will likely continue to limit the countries’ military cooperation.

Chinese defence industry supports Russia’s warfighting in Ukraine

China and Russia have prioritised and strengthened their defence industry cooperation. This cooperation strengthens the defence industry and defence modernisation in both countries, but it is sensitive, and the two sides strive to keep the cooperation concealed from the outside world.

China supports Russia’s warfighting in Ukraine by providing critical resources to the Russian defence industry, including machinery and dual-use equipment and components. China is willing to go far in supporting Russia, to avoid a Russian defeat in Ukraine and subsequent risk of regime collapse. China will continue to support Russia in 2025 despite Western pressure to end it, but carefully adjust it so as to avoid incurring Western sanctions.

Strengthened but lopsided trade relationship

Trade is the most extensive form of cooperation between China and Russia, and it has increased sharply, especially after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Chinese customs data indicate that the value of bilateral trade rose to a record-high USD 240 billion in 2023, and looked to increase further in 2024.

The trade relationship is increasingly asymmetrical in China’s favour. China is Russia’s most important market for export of Russian raw materials, the primary supplier of inputs to Russia’s defence industry and a significant provider of consumer goods to the Russian market. Trade with China accounts for nearly 40 per cent of Russia’s international trade volume, making China by far Russia’s most important trading partner. China’s trade with Russia, on the other hand, only accounts for five per cent of its international trade volume. The war in Ukraine has increased Russia’s dependence on trade with China, which is crucial to mitigating the impact of Western sanctions.